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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Personal  data  lie  at the forefront  of  different  business  models  and  constitute  the  main  source
of revenue  of  several  online  companies.  In many  cases,  consumers  may  have  incomplete
information  or may  be inattentive  about  the  digital  transactions  of  their  data. This  paper
investigates  whether  highlighting  positive  or negative  aspects  of  online  privacy  policies,
thereby  mitigating  the  informational  problem,  can  affect  consumers’  privacy  actions  and
attitudes.  Results  of  an  online  survey  experiment  indicate  that  participants  adopt  a more
conservative stance  on disclosing  sensitive  and identifiable  information,  even  when positive
attitudes  of companies  towards  their  privacy  are  made  salient,  compared  to  when  privacy
is not  mentioned.  On  the other  hand,  they  do  not  change  their  attitudes  and  social  actions
towards  privacy.  These  findings  suggest  that  privacy  behavior  is  not  necessarily  sensitive  to
exposure  to objective  threats  or benefits  of disclosing  personal  information.  Rather,  people
are inattentive  and their  dormant  privacy  concerns  may  manifest  only  when  consumers
are  asked  to  think  about  privacy.
© 2017  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
. Introduction
Agreeing with the terms and conditions and privacy policies of online service providers has become an almost daily task
or billions of people worldwide.1 By ticking the consent box, online consumers usually give permission to service providers
o collect, share or trade their personal data in exchange for various online services. Indeed, personal data lie at the forefront
f different business models and constitute an important source of revenue for several online companies, such as Google
nd its subsidiary DoubleClick, Facebook and Amazon (Taylor 2004; Casadesus-Masanell and Hervas-Drane, 2015). Despite
iving formal consent, consumers are often unaware of what these digital transactions involve (Acquisti et al., 2015b) and
ave incomplete information about the consequences of disclosing personal information – when, how and why their data
re going to be collected and with whom these data are going to be traded (Acquisti and Grossklags, 2005b; Vila et al., 2003).
∗ Corresponding author at: Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Faculty of Economics and Management, 39100 Bolzano, Italy.
E-mail addresses: helia.r.marreiros@gmail.com (H. Marreiros), mirco.tonin@unibz.it (M.  Tonin), m.vlassopoulos@soton.ac.uk (M.  Vlassopoulos).
1 As of March 31, 2016, Facebook had 1.65 billion monthly active users. http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.03.024
167-2681/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
.0/).
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A considerable number of studies (Acquisti 2004; Acquisti and Grossklags, 2005a; Acquisti et al., 2015a; Brandimarte
and Acquisti, 2012; Chellappa and Sin, 2005; Jensen and Potts, 2005; Norberg et al., 2007) and consumer surveys show that
consumers are generally concerned about privacy,2 while the issue of privacy regulation has entered the policy agenda with
important challenges being raised, for instance, regarding the scope of government surveillance and the legal framework
surrounding data sharing. For instance, reforming data protection rules in the EU is currently a policy priority for the European
Commission.3 At the same time, some online companies (e.g. the search engine DuckDuckGo) use enhanced privacy as a
way of differentiating their product (Tsai et al., 2011), or even build their business model around the protection of privacy
(e.g. Disconnect.me).4
The standard approach to privacy posits that consumers use all available information to make privacy decisions con-
sidering the benefits and costs associated with revealing personal information (e.g. Acquisti et al., 2015b; Posner, 1981;
Stigler, 1980; Varian, 1997). In other words, each time consumers face a request to disclose personal information to service
providers, they process the available information and decide accordingly by evaluating the risks and benefits of this exchange
(Chellappa and Sin, 2005; Culnan 1993; Culnan and Armstrong, 1999; Dinev and Hart, 2006; Hann et al., 2008; Hui and Png,
2006; Xu et al., 2010). Sharing personal information provides consumers with benefits that are tangible (e.g. free access to
online services, personalized ads, discounts) and intangible (e.g. the possibility to connect with long-lost friends), but also
gives rise to potential costs (e.g. risk of identity theft, shame of exposure of personal information, potential exposure to price
discrimination, being bothered by an excessive volume of ads).5
While consumers may  be aware of the many benefits of disclosing personal information, the potential costs are not so clear.
There is evidence that consumers tend to disclose their personal information most of the time (Acquisti and Grossklags, 2012;
Adjerid et al., 2013, 2016; Beresford et al., 2012; Goldfarb and Tucker, 2012; Olivero and Lunt, 2004); yet, it is questionable
whether this is due to the benefits of disclosure generally being considered greater than the associated costs – that is,
whether this is an informed and rational choice. To start with, consumers may  fail to fully inform themselves, even if the
relevant information is readily available. Indeed, although users mechanically accept the terms and conditions by ticking a
box, few read the privacy policies (Jensen and Potts, 2004; Privacy Leadership Initiative, 2001; TRUSTe, 2006) and those who
do try to read them find them time-consuming and difficult to understand (McDonald and Cranor, 2008; Turow et al., 2005).
Furthermore, there is growing evidence emerging from psychology and behavioral economics that bounded rationality and
several behavioral biases and heuristics influence individuals’ decision-making in this realm. Examples are optimism bias
(e.g. Baek et al., 2014), overconfidence (Jensen and Potts, 2005; Brandimarte et al., 2013) and hyperbolic discounting (Acquisti
and Grossklags, 2003, 2005a). Consequently, individuals face incomplete information, bounded rationality and behavioral
biases, which can affect their choices regarding sharing personal information online (Acquisti, 2004; Acquisti and Grossklags,
2005a, 2007; Baddeley, 2011; Reidenberg et al., 2015).
In this paper, we experimentally investigate to what extent exposure to information about how online companies deal
with personal information (trading or not personal data) influences privacy decisions. In particular, we investigate whether
information about the degree of privacy protection has an impact on disclosure actions and on privacy attitudes, as well as
on social actions. Becoming more aware of the threats associated with disclosure of personal information could influence
consumers to change their own individual behavior – for instance by withholding information, but it could also lead to an
increased pressure on policy makers to take action – for instance, by implementing more consumer-friendly regulations. In
the language of Hirschman (1970), a consumer could react to information about threats to online privacy by “exit” (with-
holding their own information) or “voice” (asking for more protection for all users), or both. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first paper to investigate both these aspects. In light of the regulatory activism highlighted above, the effect of
information on public opinion and on the willingness to engage in social actions is particularly relevant.
As privacy-related stories attract more headlines in mainstream media,6 an interesting question is to explore how people
react to information regarding privacy reported in the news. Thus, we  investigate whether news coverage of actual privacy
practices by companies affects users’ privacy preferences. To address this question, we  conducted an online survey experi-
ment, with around 500 respondents, involving an informational intervention. In particular, we use extracts from newspaper
2 For instance, 72% of US consumers revealed concerns with online tracking and behavioral profiling by companies – Consumer-Union 2008–
(http://consumersunion.org/news/poll-consumers-concerned-about-internet-privacy/).
3 In January 2012, the European Commission proposed a comprehensive reform of data protection rules in the EU. The completion of this reform was a
policy  priority for 2015. On 15 December 2015, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission reached agreement on the new data protection
rules,  establishing a modern and harmonized data protection framework across the EU. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) will be a law in the
beginning of 2018. http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/reform/index en.htm
4 The interaction between privacy protection regulation and market performance and structure is analyzed in Campbell et al. (2015), Goldfarb and Tucker
(2011) and Shy and Stenbacka (2015).
5 The three main benefits of the privacy trade-off identified in the privacy literature are financial rewards, such as discounts (Caudill and Murphy, 2000;
Hann  et al., 2008; Phelps et al., 2000; Xu et al., 2010), personalization and customization of information content (Chellappa and Shivendu, 2010; Chellappa
and  Sin, 2005) and social interactions and network externalities (Lin and Lu, 2011). See also Acquisti et al. (2015b) for an overview of the cost and benefits
of  sharing information for both data holders and data subjects.
6 As of 26 Jan 2016, there are 2,170,000 hits in Google news category for the search “online privacy”. For instance, The Guardian reported
a  study where Londoners accepted the terms and conditions for access to public Wi-Fi with a clause stating that they accept to give up their
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rticles related to privacy practices of companies like Facebook and Dropbox and ask whether exposure to these shifts users’
rivacy concerns.7
Our experimental design involves three treatments. Participants are randomly presented with a newspaper article extract
ighlighting a positive, neutral or negative privacy practice. We  then collect three measures of participants’ privacy concerns:
) actual propensity to disclose personal information (e.g. name, email) in a demographic web-based questionnaire that we
dministered; b) participation in a social action: whether users vote for a donation to be made to a privacy advocacy group
r to an alternative, not privacy-related, group; and c) stated attitudes toward privacy and personalization elicited through
 survey. Thus, we measure both privacy stated preferences and private and social actions related to privacy.
This design allows us to examine two alternative hypotheses. First, previous survey evidence suggests an impact of privacy
isks on privacy concerns and on intentions to sharing personal data (Dinev and Hart, 2006; Malhotra et al., 2004). We
herefore expect that, in our experiment, highlighting positive (negative) features of the privacy tradeoff (such as protection
f consumers’ personal data vs commercial exploitation of their data) will make participants less (more) concerned about
rivacy and we expect this to be reflected in people’s attitudes toward privacy and their willingness to engage is social action
romoting privacy protection. Another possible driver of behavior in this study relates to the recent literature in economics
hat shows that limited attention, salience and cognitive costs impact decision making in a variety of contexts: consumption
Chetty et al., 2009; Hossain and Morgan, 2006; Bollinger et al., 2011; Allcott and Taubinsky, 2015), saving (Karlan et al.,
016), farming (Hanna et al., 2014) or school choice (Hastings and Weinstein, 2008). Two  of our informational treatments
positive and negative), contain news articles related to privacy, which might focus participants’ attention to the issue of
rivacy – independent of the actual information that the news item conveys about businesses’ privacy practices. Differently
o what the first hypothesis predicts, if participants are inattentive to privacy at the beginning of the survey, they might
educe their willingness to disclose personal information upon prompted to focus on the issue in both the positive and
egative treatments.
We  find that the propensity of participants to disclose identifiable information (such as name, email) and sensitive infor-
ation (such as mother’s maiden name) decreases when they are exposed to information regarding privacy. This is true
ven when the aspect of privacy they read about relates to positive attitudes of the companies towards their users. Just
entioning the presence of privacy issues, such as how companies are adopting practices to protect users’ data, decreases
elf-disclosure. This suggests that privacy concerns are dormant and may  manifest when users are asked to think about
rivacy; and that privacy behavior is not necessarily sensitive to exposure to objective threats or benefits of personal infor-
ation disclosure. In this regard, the paper connects to recent research that proposes that individuals may  only attend to
nformation that they consider relevant for the decision at hand and that interventions that help decision makers attend to
ey neglected dimensions may  improve outcomes (Schwartzstein, 2014; Hanna et al., 2014; LaRiviere and Neilson, 2015).
ur result is also consistent with previous findings that contextual cues (Benndorf et al., 2015; John et al., 2011; Hughes-
oberts and Kani-Zabihi, 2014) and notifications about privacy breaches (Feri et al., 2016) do have an impact on levels of
isclosure of sensitive information and, more generally, with the literature on salience and framing effects (Stasser, 1992;
ruckman, 2001; Levin et al., 1998; Kahneman, 2003).
Despite finding an effect on disclosure we do not find treatment effects on social actions, nor on privacy attitudes. In
he privacy literature, this disconnect between actions and attitudes – the so-called privacy paradox – is well documented
e.g. Norberg et al., 2007), while we are not aware of previous work demonstrating a disconnect between private and social
ctions (or, more generally, investigating social actions related to privacy).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design along with the procedures.
ection 3 states the hypotheses, while section 4 presents the results. Section 5 offers some conclusions. Appendix A contains
ome additional results while Appendix B contains the news extracts.
. Experimental design and sample
To understand the effect of highlighting positive and negative privacy practices on the behavior of online users, we
esigned an online survey experiment. We  recruited a total of 508 participants in June 2015 (in two  waves), using Pro-
ific Academic, a UK-based crowdsourcing community that recruits participants for academic purposes.8 Each participant
eceived the amount of £1 upon completion of a survey that took on average 10 min  to complete, which translated as £6
er hour, on average. The recruitment was restricted to participants born in the UK, the US, Ireland, Australia and Canada,
nd whose first language was English. The experiment was designed in Qualtrics Online Sample, and the randomization of
reatments was  programmed in the survey software.9
7 The information used in the experiment was  rated in a pre-test as reflecting either a positive, negative or neutral attitude towards their users, by
tudents of the University of Southampton.
8 Prolific Academic is a crowdsourcing platform for scientific studies in which researchers post studies and recruit participants. It is used by academic
esearchers worldwide and has a worldwide participant pool with more than 50,000 reliable participants. More information about the platform is available
t  www.prolific.ac. A recent comparison across online platforms (including M-Turk and Prolific Academic) by Peer et al. (2016) reveals that participants in
rolific Academic are less dishonest and more naïve, in the meaning that they display less familiarity with commonly used research materials, compared
o  M-Turk and produced data quality comparable to M-Turk’s.
9 The survey is available as supplementary material.
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2.1. Experimental manipulations
As experimental manipulations, we used extracts from newspaper articles.10 These news extracts provided information
that highlighted a positive, a negative or a neutral aspect of companies’ privacy practices and were selected through a
pre-test, where we asked 25 students to evaluate the news extracts.
In particular, for the negative treatment we selected a news extract on how Facebook is making money by selling uniden-
tifiable data of their users; and for the positive treatment an article on how Dropbox and Microsoft adopt privacy norms
that safeguard users’ cloud data (ISO 27018 standard). Finally, for the neutral treatment we selected an article that refers to
the health benefits of wearable tech, and is therefore not directly related to privacy issues.
We use a between-subject design, where each participant is exposed to only one treatment – i.e. is exposed to only one
of the extracts – before we measure privacy preferences. To further validate our experimental manipulation, at the end we
asked participants to classify the three extracts that were part of their experiment as positive, negative or neutral, in terms
of the attitude they revealed vis-à-vis users’ privacy.
2.2. Measures of privacy preferences
To start with, participants were shown a brief study description, which mentioned that the study was about online
privacy, that data collection was subject to the Data Protection Act 1998, and that The University of Southampton ethics
committee had approved the study.11 We  then proceeded to evaluate the effect of our experimental manipulation on three
measures of privacy preferences
1. disclosure of personal information;
2. participation in a social action – voting to allocate a donation to a foundation that protects digital rights or to a foundation
unrelated to privacy;
3. attitudes towards privacy and personalization.
For the first measure, designed to test the impact of the experimental manipulation on self-disclosure,  participants were
initially asked to carefully read one of the statements that are part of our experimental manipulation and indicate whether
they had previous knowledge of it. Then, they were asked to reply to 15 demographic and personal questions, covering
more or less sensitive information, like gender, income, weekly expenditure, and personal debt situation.12 The answer
to the first 13 questions had to be provided through a scroll-down menu that included the option “Prefer not to say”,
so that the effort required to answer was the same as the effort required not to answer. Participants could not proceed
without selecting an option from the menu. Providing name and email was optional, as a scroll-down option was not
possible. Notice that providing false information could potentially be an alternative way to preserve privacy. Prolific Academic
independently collected some demographic information when participants first registered with the service. Comparing our
data to the demographic data collected by Prolific Academic for age, gender and country of residence, we did not find
significant differences, thus indicating that lying is not common (see Table A5 in Appendix A for detailed information).
Moreover, most names matched the emails, when provided. To verify whether participants read the questions carefully,
we also included a control question (“This is a control question. Could you please skip this question?”), with a “normal”
scroll-down menu (including numbers from 1 to 4 and the option “Prefer not to say”). The last two questions, which were
first name and email, were not mandatory.13Regarding the second measure of privacy preferences, contribution to a social action,  participants were first asked to read
the very same statement they had seen earlier and indicate whether they thought that their friends knew about it. The
purpose of this was to re-establish the saliency of the provided information. We  then asked participants to choose which
institution should receive a donation of £100 from us: EFF – Electronic Frontier Foundation (an organization that fights for
online rights and, therefore, is concerned with privacy issues) or Transparency International (an organization that fights
against corruption and is therefore not directly related to privacy issues). In particular, participants were informed that “We
are donating £100 to charity. (∼ $154 | ∼ 135D ). You can choose which organization we donate the money to: EFF (Electronic
10 A transcription of the news extracts can be found in Appendix B.
11 More information is available at http://www.southampton.ac.uk/legalservices/what-we-do/data-protection-and-foi.page
12 Typically, more personally defining or identifying items, such as name, or financial or medical data are perceived as more sensitive (Goldfarb and Tucker
2012;  Malheiros et al., 2013).
13 The stage introduction read as follows: “Please provide some information about yourself. Note that you can choose not to provide the information by
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rontier Foundation) or Transparency international. Please note that the institution that receives more votes will be the one
eceiving the donation”,  and then were provided with a description of the two  organizations.14,15
For the third measure of privacy preferences, the one regarding attitudes, we  started by asking participants to read the
tatement one more time and indicate whether they thought that society in general knew about it. Again, this question
ad the purpose of maintaining the salience of the information. We then asked them to take the survey developed by
hellappa and Sin (2005) that evaluates their concern level about online privacy, how much they value personalization, and
he likelihood of providing personal information.
Finally, participants were asked to reply to eleven sensitive questions structured in the same way as the initial ques-
ionnaire. For instance, we asked information on the number and gender of sexual partners, passport number, name of first
et, and mother’s maiden name. Some of these questions are commonly asked to recover passwords and could therefore
e seen as very privacy-intrusive. Sensitive questions might have a higher impact on participants’ willingness to disclose
nformation (Joinson et al., 2008).
After the experiment, participants were asked to answer some more questions. First, to control for the effectiveness of
he manipulation, they were asked to evaluate the extent to which the three news extracts used in the experiment revealed
 positive, negative or neutral attitude of the company towards their users. Second, we asked if participants were more or
ess willing to share their personal data online after reading these extracts and if they were willing to pay a small fee to
rotect their identifiable and non-identifiable information. Third, we added a final survey about online privacy concerns
Buchanan et al., 2007); our decision to include this was  based on the fact that it is designed exclusively to evaluate privacy
oncerns, contrasting with the Chellappa and Sin survey which, besides evaluating privacy concerns, also evaluates the value
f personalization and the likelihood of disclosing information. Finally, we asked some optional miscellaneous questions
elated to online privacy and the experiment, e.g. whether participants usually read privacy policies or already knew of the
wo non-profit organizations.
.3. Characterization of the subject pool
Our final sample consists of 475 participants.16 47% of the participants were female and the average age was  28, with 80%
art of the “millennial generation” (i.e. born between 1982 and 2004: Howe and Strauss, 2000). Most of the participants were
rom the US, 63%, or the UK, 27%; 81% were white and 45% were students; 73% had two  to four years of college education; and
0% had an income lower than 40,000 (in local currency).17 The average time to complete the survey was  thirteen minutes
see Table A1 in Appendix A for more detailed descriptive statistics). These characteristics are balanced across the three
reatments.
. Hypotheses
Our experimental design allows us to investigate the extent to which participants are using the informational content of
he news messages to inform the privacy decisions in the experiment or whether instead the messages serve to focus their
ttention to the fact that there is a privacy context in the decision-making.
Previous evidence suggests that perceived privacy risks raise privacy concerns and have an adverse effect on willingness
o reveal personal information (Dinev and Hart, 2006; Malhotra et al., 2004). If the messages have informational value, we
hen expect participants in the negative treatment to be less willing to share information in the first stage, less likely to
upport the charity promoting digital rights in the second stage and to display more conservative attitudes toward privacy
nd personalization in stage 3, than participants in the neutral and positive treatments. Similarly, we  expect participants in
he positive treatment to be more relaxed about sharing private information than those in the neutral treatment.
ypothesis 1. (Information) People’s privacy attitudes and actions will respond to the informational content of the message
hey see.Another possibility is that participants are not unaware of the information regarding privacy that we transmit to them.
owever, the mere mention of privacy in the messages might make them more attentive to the issue. This perspective would
e consistent with existing theoretical work and evidence that when decision makers have limited attention, inefficient
14 “EFF (Electronic Frontier Foundation) is the leading nonprofit organization defending civil liberties in the digital world. Founded in 1990, EFF
hampions user privacy, free expression, and innovation through impact litigation, policy analysis, grassroots activism, and technology development.”
ttps://www.eff.org
15 “Transparency international has as a mission to stop corruption and promote transparency, accountability and integrity at all levels and across all
ectors  of society. Their Core Values are: transparency, accountability, integrity, solidarity, courage, justice and democracy.” http://www.transparency.org
16 Out of the initial 508 participants, we rejected 33 submissions in total: 8 submissions from those that fail the control question (which asked to skip
hat  question) and 25 submissions from those that completed the survey in less than 5 min. The aim is to exclude those who did not take the task seriously,
ot  reading the questions or doing it extremely quickly. We  find similar results running the analysis with the full sample.
17 Information about gender, nationality, education, student and employment status was  provided by Prolific Academic. Information about income level
as  provided by the participants in the self-disclosure stage. Prolific Academic only had information about student status for 468 participants and about
ender  for 472 participants. For these reasons, in the regressions controlling for individual characteristics we have 465 observations.
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Table  1
Self-disclosure stage.
All Positive treatment Pos – Neg Negative treatment Neg – Neu Neutral treatment Neu – Pos
N % “DIS” N % “DIS” p-value N % “DIS” p-value N % “DIS” p-value
Disclosure 475 84% 154 81% 0.146 163 87% 0.291 158 83% 0.688
Give  Name 475 50% 154 45% 0.664 163 47% 0.028** 158 59% 0.009***
Give  Email 475 37% 154 31% 0.709 163 33% 0.012** 158 47% 0.005***
Disclosure-Index: disclose the information in all the items was  scored as ‘1’ and use of the option “prefer not to say” in any of the 13 items was scored as
‘0’.  Give Name and Give Email: disclose the information was scored as ‘1’.
%  DIS: Percentage of participants that disclosed the information.
P-values of pairwise chi2 test on treatment differences: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.decisions can be made not due to lack of information, but due to failure to attend to some features of the data (Hanna et al.,
2014; LaRiviere and Neilson, 2015).
Hypothesis 2. (Inattention) People’s privacy attitudes and actions will not respond to the actual information content of
the message they see, but their privacy attitudes and actions will be affected when prompted to think about privacy.
Accordingly, we expect participants to be more conservative in treatments negative and positive than in the neutral
treatment, as the latter does not focus attention on privacy.
4. Results
Here we present the results for each of our three privacy measures. Before doing so, we checked whether our experimental
manipulation was successful. To do this, we exploited the fact that at the end we asked participants to classify the three
news extracts used in the experiment as representing a positive, negative or neutral attitude of the company towards its
users. What we found is that 84% of the participants considered that the extract chosen for the positive treatment indeed
reflected a positive attitude; 93% of the participants classified the extract chosen for the negative treatment as negative; and
59% of the participants classified the extract chosen for the neutral treatment as neutral18 (see Table A2 in Appendix A for
more details). Thus, the majority of the participants classified correctly the news extract after being presented with it.
4.1. Self-disclosure
To analyze treatment effects, we created a dummy  variable that takes the value of 1 if the information is provided and
0 otherwise. We then summated these dummies to create a summary variable called Disclosure-index that can take values
between 0 (if no information is provided) and 13 (if information is provided for all 13 demographic questions). We  then
created three variables measuring self-disclosure, all taking the values 0/1:
1. Disclosure: equals 1 if the participant discloses personal information in all the first 13 items of the demographic
questionnaire19;
2. Give Name: equals 1 if the participant discloses their first name;
3. Give Email: equals 1 if the participant discloses their email address.
Table 1 describes the percentages of disclosure of information per treatment. We  can observe that the large majority of
participants (84%) disclosed all the personal information that could not directly identify them as individuals.20 This result
is consistent with previous studies about privacy disclosure (see for example Beresford et al., 2012; Goldfarb and Tucker,
2012). However, there was significantly lower disclosure of the information that could identify them as individuals, such as
name (only 50% provided their first name) and email (only 37% disclosed their email address). With the exception of three
participants, those who disclosed email also disclosed name. We found significant differences in the disclosure of identifiable
information (Give-Name and Give-Email), with a higher incidence of disclosure of name and email in the neutral treatment
compared to the negative and positive treatments. However, we did not find significant differences between the positive and
the negative treatments21; thus it does not seem to be the case that providing “negative” information makes participants
more reluctant to disclose private information.
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Table  2
Regressions on self-disclosure.
Disclosure Give Name Give Email
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Positive treatment −0.018 0.026 −0.148*** −0.152*** −0.157*** −0.134**
(0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Negative treatment 0.042 0.057 −0.123** −0.111** −0.137** −0.132**
(0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Constant 0.833*** −0.153** 0.637*** 0.401*** 0.482*** 0.507***
(0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.15) (0.04) (0.15)
Individual characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes
N  475 465 475 465 475 465
R-sqr  0.005 0.499 0.025 0.094 0.022 0.068
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Dependent variables: Disclosure – disclose the information in all the 13 items was scored as ‘1’; Give Name and Give Email – disclose the information was


































n all the models, we control for recruitment wave. Individual characteristics refer to demographic characteristics as age, gender, nationality (UK or non-UK)
thnicity (white or not) Student and work status, education and income (see Table A11 in Appendix A for coefficients and significance level of the individual
haracteristics).
These results are confirmed in a regression analysis (Table 2), where we estimate OLS regressions for each of three
easures of disclosure on a set of treatment dummies, plus a dummy  controlling for recruitment wave. Including – or
ot including – individual characteristics (age, gender, nationality, ethnicity, student and work status, education level and
nnual income level) does not change the outcome.22,23 Also, including a dummy  controlling for previous awareness of the
nformation we provide gives similar results (for summary statistics of awareness see Tables A6–A8 in Appendix A).24
As mentioned in the previous section, participants were also asked to disclose particularly sensitive questions, where, as
efore, participants could disclose information or choose the option ‘prefer not to say.’ We  included 11 items: religious (yes
r no), race, number of sexual partners, number of serious relations, partner’s gender, weight, high school name, passport
umber, name of first pet, mother’s maiden name, and favorite place. Compared to the demographic questionnaire, partic-
pants were more reluctant to disclose sensitive information. For instance, nobody disclosed passport number and 86% did
ot disclose mother’s maiden name. Nevertheless, many participants disclosed information for sensitive items; for instance,
1% disclosed the number of sexual partners (see Table A9 for non-disclosure percentages per variable and per treatment).
To analyze treatment effects, for each of the 11 items, we created a dummy  variable that takes the value of 1 if the
nformation is provided and 0 otherwise. We  then summated these dummies to create a summary variable called Disclosure-
ndex-SQ that can take values between 0 (if no information is provided) and 11 (if information is provided for all 11 questions).
ig. 1 shows a histogram with the distribution of this index by treatment and in total.25 We  can see that the distribution
or the neutral treatments is shifted towards higher values, i.e. more disclosure. Mann-Whitney tests confirm that there is
ndeed a significant difference between the negative and the neutral treatments (p-value = 0.011) and between the positive
nd the neutral treatments (p-value = 0.025), while we found no differences between the positive and the negative ones
p-value = 0.979). This result is also confirmed in a Poisson regression analysis, with and without controls for individual
haracteristics (see Table A12 in Appendix A).What is the interpretation of these results? Participants do not seem to react in the way  predicted in Hypothesis 1
Information), with positive information inducing more disclosure and negative information increasing their concern for
rivacy. The fact that participants disclosed more information in the neutral treatment, where privacy was  not mentioned, as
18 In the neutral treatment 27% classified the extract as positive and 14% as negative.
19 Age, health situation, marital status, education, number of times moved house, gender, number of children, number of credit cards, debt situation,
ountry live in, maximum relationship length, annual income, money spent per week.
20 See Table A3 in Appendix A for a full description of the percentages of the use of the option “prefer not to say” per variable and per treatment.
21 Chi2 test: Positive – Negative: Disclosure: p-value = 0.146; Give-name: 0.664; Give-email: 0.709; Negative-Neutral: Disclosure: p-value = 0.291; Give-
ame: 0.028; Give-email: 0.012; Neutral – Positive: Disclosure: p-value = 0.688; Give-name: 0.009; Give-email: 0.005.
22 Our results indicate that less wealthy individuals and white people are more likely to disclose personal information (for details, see Table A11 in
ppendix A). The results on the relationship between wealth and self-disclosure are consistent with those of Goldfarb and Tucker (2012). The income
ariables are divided in five dummy variables − Annual income less 20; Annual income 20 40; Annual income 40 60; Annual income more 60 and Pre-
er  not reveal income. The variable prefer not to reveal income was  the omitted variable.
23 Given that, as shown in Table A2, 31% of the participants of the neutral treatment considered the statement positive, as a robustness check, we run
he  OLS regressions excluding them. Even in this case, participants disclose significantly less information in the positive treatment. The coefficients when
ontrolling for individual characteristics are 0.027 (s.e. 0.04) for the Disclosure-Index, −0.139** (s.e. 0.06) for Give Name and −0.126** (s.e. 0.06) for Give
mail.
24 We present the results of OLS regression analysis, as they are easy to interpret. Logit and Probit models give similar results. Poisson and Tobit regressions
or  the Disclosure-index also give similar results.
25 Four participants did not choose the option “prefer not to say” for the passport item, as they made some comments, such as “I don’t have one” or “I
on’t  understand the reasons to ask for my passport number”. We  consider this as a form of non-disclosure.
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the information provided referred to the advantages of wearable tech, than in the other treatments suggests that, consistently
with Hypothesis 2 (Inattention), being prompted to think about privacy issues has an effect on individual online behavior,
decreasing self-disclosure. As in Joinson et al. (2008), just mentioning privacy focuses people’s minds on the issue and
induces them to disclose less information. Notice, however, that Joinson et al.’s (2008) study simply primes participants
with a survey, while we distinguish between positive and negative information and show that disclosure is reduced even if
the information is positive from the point of view of the protection of privacy.
4.2. Social action
We  now analyze the social action. Participants had to vote to assign a £100 donation between two  charities. We  found that,
overall, 59% of the participants voted in favor of EFF, with no significant differences across treatments (pairwise chi2 tests:
Positive–Negative: p-value = 0.157; Negative–Neutral: p-value = 0.838; Positive–Neutral: p-value = 0.228).26,27 Regression
analysis (Table 3), where we can control for individual characteristics as well as for familiarity with the two  organizations,
confirms the absence of treatment differences. Not surprisingly, we find that the likelihood of voting for EFF increases as
people are more familiar with its work and decreases as people are more familiar with the work of the competing charity
(see Table A13 in Appendix A for more details). Thus, it seems that the significant impact we found for the neutral treatment
in terms of self-disclosure does not carry over to the social action.
4.3. Privacy concern survey
To analyze attitudes towards privacy, we follow Chellappa and Sin (2005) and ran a factor analysis on the survey. Recall
that the first six questions were designed to understand the value that participants ascribe to personalization (questions
Att1–Att6), the following four questions were designed to evaluate the level of concern about online privacy (questions
Att7–Att10) and the last two questions were designed to understand the likelihood of the participants disclosing their
personal data to online service providers (questions Att11–Att12). We  found three factors:
1. Factor 1, labeled “Personal”, includes Att1 to Att4 (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.79);
2. Factor 2, “Privacy-concern”, includes Att7, Att9 and Att10 (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.67);
26 Overall, EFF received more votes than TI and, therefore, has received the donation.
27 See Table A4 in Appendix A for treatment differences.
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Table  3
Regressions on Social action – Charity.
[1] [2]
Positive treatment 0.067 0.055
(0.06) (0.05)




Individual characteristics No Yes
Charity familiarity No Yes
N  475 465
R-sqr 0.005 0.147
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Dependent variable: Charity – vote to donate to EFF (Electronic Frontier Foundation) was scored as ‘1’ and vote to donate to TI (Transparency international)
was  scored as ‘0.’ In all the models we control for recruitment wave. Individual characteristics are the same as in the previous table. Charity familiarity
refers  to level of knowledge participants had about the charity. The two  variables EFF-familiarity and TI-familiarity are discrete variables, where 1 is totally
unfamiliar and 5 is extensive knowledge.
Table 4
Regressions on Privacy concern – Survey.
Privacy concern Likely Give Information
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Positive treatment 0.001 0.002 −0.004 −0.000
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Negative treatment 0.018 0.027 0.017 0.025
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Constant 0.629*** 0.258 0.825*** 0.954***
(0.04) (0.16) (0.03) (0.10)
Individual characteristics No Yes No Yes
Personalization No Yes No Yes
N  475 465 475 465
R-sqr  0.006 0.145 0.002 0.032



















inary dependent variables: Privacy-concern – scored as ‘1’ if the factor concern was higher than 4; Likely-give-information – scored as ‘1’ if the factor
ikely  give info was higher than 4. In all the models, we control for recruitment wave. Individual characteristics are the same as in the previous tables.
ersonalization – scored as ‘1’ if the factor Personal was higher than 4.
. Factor 3, “Likely-give-info”, includes Att5, Att6, Att11 and Att12 (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.74).28
For the average of each item (Att1–Att12), and the average of the factors see Table A10 in Appendix A.
To evaluate the treatment effects, we created dichotomous variables for the three factors. To achieve this, we first calcu-
ated the average score for the questions, scored between 1 and 7, belonging to the corresponding factor. Then, we  created
 dummy  variable for each factor, taking the value of ‘1′ if the average score is strictly greater than 4. Thus, the variables
Personal”, “Privacy-concern” and “Likely-give-info” take the value of 1 if the participant valued personalization, revealed
oncerns about privacy, or displayed a high likelihood of disclosing personal information. We  found no treatment differences
n the attitudinal survey.29 A regression analysis confirms that “Privacy-concern” and “Likely-give-info” are indeed unre-
ated to treatment, whether or not we control for individual characteristics and the value of personalization, as measured
y “Personalization” (see Table 4). Looking at individual characteristics, we  find that males, unemployed people and high
chool students tend to be more concerned about their privacy, while those who value personalization are more concerned
28 The factors we find differ slightly from those defined by Chellappa and Sin (2005). In their case, the first factor CS1 (Per) is the average of Att1-Att6
uestions; the second CS2 (Concern) is the average of Att7-Att10 questions, while the last CS3 (Likely) is the average of Att11-Att12 questions. In our factor
nalysis  Att8 is not part of any of the three factors. In a Varimax rotation at 0.4 Att8 is eliminated, therefore factor 2 ‘privacy-concern’ is constituted by
ttributes Att7, Att9 and Att10. Att8 refers to concerns about anonymous information collected automatically that cannot be used to identify the users,
uch  as computer, network information and operating system. The results are similar including att8.
29 Pairwise chi2 tests. Personal: Positive-Negative: p = 0.809; Negative–Neutral: p = 0.597; Positive-Neutral: p = 0.446; Privacy-concern: Positive-Negative:
 = 0.769; Negative–Neutral: p = 0.734; Positive-Neutral: p = 0.965; Likely-give-info: Positive-Negative: p = 0.598; Negative–Neutral: p = 0.669; Positive-
eutral: p = 0.919.
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about their privacy and are less likely to provide information (thus making personalization more difficult). See Table A13 in
Appendix A for more detailed results.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we explored how people respond to information about privacy in the form of news reports. We  experi-
mentally varied whether the information to which consumers are exposed reveals a positive or negative privacy practice
of the company or whether information is neutral vis-à-vis users’ privacy. We  then observed the self-disclosure of personal
information by users, their stated concerns regarding privacy and their choice of giving a donation either to a charity advo-
cating for privacy or to a charity not directly related to privacy issues. What we find is that whenever information is about
privacy, the type of information (positive or negative) does not matter, while information not mentioning privacy increases
disclosure of personal data, without affecting either stated privacy concerns or social actions.
These findings suggest that inattention may  be an important aspect in privacy decision-making. We  could then expect
that online users will be more careful in the type of information they choose to disclose if privacy issues are more widely
discussed in the public arena, for instance because of scandals related to data leakage or thefts (e.g. the recent examples
regarding the US Post Office, or financial institution JPMorgan Chase & Co, or big retailers like Target, Kmart and Home
Depot). A more cautious attitude in response to data thefts news is not too surprising. Our results, however, suggest that
even news about increased data protection for consumers, for instance through legislative initiatives, would trigger the same
reaction. Notably, in our setting, users react through personal actions, but not through social actions. This suggests that the
“voice” response to privacy issues may  be relatively weak, with obvious implications for the political process.
From a business perspective, it seems that making privacy practices more visible and transparent might backfire as this
could nudge users to become more reluctant to share personal information and thereby derail existing business models that
are based on tracking and sharing personal information. The question of how to reconcile the need to respect the right of
users to make informed choices about online privacy with the current business model of a multibillion-dollar industry is a
major challenge for policy makers, businesses and academics working in the area.
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Appendix A.
Table A1
Characterization of the subject pool.
All Positive treatment Negative treatment Neutral treatment Min  Max
N % N % N % N %
Age 475 28* 154 29* 163 28* 158 28* 18 67
Age  – millennial 475 80% 154 79% 163 80% 158 81% 0 1
Female  472 47% 154 42% 161 47% 157 52% 0 1
UK  national 475 27% 154 28% 163 25% 158 28% 0 1
US  national 475 63% 154 64% 163 61% 158 64% 0 1
White  475 81% 154 85% 163 75% 158 82% 0 1
Student status 468 45% 151 48% 160 45% 157 43% 0 1
Full  time 475 38% 154 37% 163 40% 158 36% 0 1
Part  time 475 31% 154 25% 163 29% 158 38% 0 1
Unemployed 475 20% 154 23% 163 17% 158 20% 0 1
High  school 475 15% 154 11% 163 16% 158 19% 0 1
College 475 73% 154 77% 163 72% 158 69% 0 1
Post-grad 475 12% 154 12% 163 12% 158 12% 0 1
Income  [Less 20,000] 475 39% 154 36% 163 39% 158 41% 0 1
Income  [20,000–40,000] 475 31% 154 33% 163 31% 158 28% 0 1
Income  [40,000–60,000] 475 14% 154 11% 163 15% 158 15% 0 1
Income  [More 60,000] 475 9% 154 8% 163 7% 158 10% 0 1
Time  taken (min) 475 13* 154 12* 163 13* 158 13* 5 55
Age and time taken are continuous variables; all the other variables are binary. *Average. Income is annual.
The characterization of the subject pool is based on demographics provided by prolific academic, with the exception of Income, which is based on the
information the participants provided during the experiment in the stage of self-disclosure.
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Table  A2
Participants’ classification of news extracts.
A. Used in the Positive Treatments: Dropbox News
Positive Negative Neutral
Positive Treatment 87% 3% 10%
Negative Treatment 82% 3% 15%
Neutral Treatment 84% 1% 15%
Total  84% 2% 14%
B.  Used in the Negative Treatments: Facebook News
Positive Negative Neutral
Positive Treatment 4% 94% 2%
Negative Treatment 0% 91% 9%
Neutral Treatment 1% 92% 7%
Total  1% 93% 6%
C.  Used in the Neutral Treatments: Wearable News
Positive Negative Neutral
Positive Treatment 27% 14% 60%
Negative Treatment 22% 16% 62%
Neutral Treatment 31% 15% 54%
Total  27% 14% 59%
Panel A refers to the news extracts used in the positive treatments, Panel B refers to the news extracts used in the negative treatments and Panel C refers
to  the news extracts used in the neutral treatments. The 1st column of each panel refers to the treatments. The 2nd column of each panel indicates the
percentage of participants that classified the news extracts as positive, in each treatment. Therefore, in the Panel A, the percentage presented in the 2nd
column (Positive), 2nd row (Positive treatment) indicates how many participants in the positive treatment classified the extract as positive. The percentage
presented in the 2nd column (Positive), 3rd row (Negative treatment) indicates how many participants in the negative treatment classified the extract as
positive. The percentage presented in the 3nd column (Negative), 2nd row (Positive treatment) indicates how many participants in the positive treatment
classified the extract as negative. And so forth. The 3rd column indicates the percentage of participants that classified the extracts as negative, and the 4th
column indicates the percentage of participants that classified it as neutral.
Table A3
Demographics.
All Positive treatment Negative treatment Neutral treatment
N % N % N % N %
Age 475 0.0% 154 0.0% 163 0.0% 158 0.0%
Health  475 0.4% 154 0.0% 163 0.0% 158 1.3%
Marital  Status 475 0.6% 154 0.6% 163 0.6% 158 0.6%
Education 475 0.2% 154 0.6% 163 0.0% 158 0.0%
Moved  house 475 0.4% 154 1.3% 163 0.0% 158 0.0%
Gender  475 0.2% 154 0.0% 163 0.0% 158 0.6%
No.  Children 475 0.4% 154 0.0% 163 0.6% 158 0.6%
No.  Credit cards 475 1.5% 154 1.3% 163 1.2% 158 1.9%
Debt  situation 475 2.1% 154 3.2% 163 1.2% 158 1.9%
Country live in 475 0.0% 154 0.0% 163 0.0% 158 0.0%
Relationship 475 7.6% 154 9.1% 163 7.4% 158 6.3%
Annual  income 475 8.4% 154 11.7% 163 7.4% 158 6.3%
Spend  week 475 5.7% 154 5.8% 163 4.3% 158 7.0%
% indicates the percentage of participants not disclosing the information.
Table A4
Charity.
All Positive treatment Negative treatment Neutral treatment
N % EFF votes N % EFF votes N % EFF votes N % EFF votes
Charity 475 58.7% 154 63.6% 163 55.8% 158 57.0%
% indicates the percentage of participants voting in favor of EFF.
Table A5
Percentage of match between the demographic information collected from Prolific Academic and the information that participants disclosed.
Positive Negative Neutral Total
Age 98% 98% 97% 97%
Gender 100% 99% 99% 99%
Country 92% 87% 89% 89%
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Table  A6
Knowledge about the companies’ practices reported in the news extracts.
Positive Negative Neutral Total
Awareness of Practices 14% 47% 77% 46%
Table A7
Perception of friends’ knowledge about the companies’ practices reported in the news extracts.
Positive Negative Neutral Total
Awareness of Practices 7% 25% 66% 33%
Table A8
Perception of society’s knowledge about the companies’ practices reported in the news extracts.
Positive Negative Neutral Total
Awareness of Practices 7% 11% 47% 21%
Table A9
Sensitive questions.
All Positive treatment Negative treatment Neutral treatment
N % N % N % N %
Religious 475 4% 154 5% 163 4% 158 4%
Race  475 2% 154 3% 163 1% 158 3%
No  sexual partners 475 19% 154 22% 163 18% 158 18%
No  serious relations 475 11% 154 10% 163 13% 158 10%
Partner’s gender 475 10% 154 9% 163 12% 158 9%
Weight 475 32% 154 37% 163 34% 158 24%
High  school name 475 65% 154 71% 163 67% 158 58%
Passport number 475 100% 154 100% 163 100% 158 100%
Name  first pet 475 60% 154 62% 163 66% 158 51%
Mother  maiden name 475 86% 154 84% 163 90% 158 85%
Favorite place 475 46% 154 51% 163 50% 158 39%
% indicates the percentage of participants not disclosing the information.
Table A10
Attitudes.
All Positive Negative Neutral
Att1 5.46 5.50 5.40 5.48
Att2  5.00 4.97 4.88 5.13
Att3  3.92 3.90 3.75 4.11
Att4  3.95 3.79 3.86 4.21
Att5  4.58 4.55 4.59 4.61
Att6  5.82 5.90 5.91 5.65
Att7  4.08 3.99 4.07 4.18
Att8  5.96 5.92 5.96 6.00
Att9  3.88 3.88 3.87 3.90
Att10  5.04 5.08 4.98 5.05
Att11  4.97 4.97 4.85 5.08
Att12  5.27 5.29 5.18 5.34
Personal (Av) 4.58 4.54 4.47 4.73
Privacy concern (Av) 4.33 4.31 4.31 4.38
Likely  give info (Av) 5.16 5.18 5.13 5.17
Likert 7-point scale: Strongly disagree = 1 to Strongly agree = 7. [Att1-Att6] indicates the average of value for personalization; [Att7-Att10] indicates the
average of privacy concerns and [Att11 and Att12] indicates the average of the likelihood of disclosing information.
Factors: Personal (Av): Average [Att1-Att4]; Privacy concern (Av): Average [Att7, Att9-Att10]; Likely give info (Av): Average [Att5-Att6, Att10-Att11]. Att8
was  excluded in the factor analysis, as it does not belong to any of the 3 factors and is excluded from the varimax rotation at 0.4 Including att8 leads to
similar results.
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Table  A11
Regressions on self-disclosure.
Disclosure Give Name Give Email
[1] [2] [3]
Positive treatment 0.026 −0.152*** −0.134**
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06)
Negative treatment 0.057* −0.111** −0.132**
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06)
Wave  −0.027 −0.141*** −0.064
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Age  0.001 0.006** 0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gender 0.004 −0.026 0.012
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05)
US  nationality −0.071** −0.088 −0.076
(0.03) (0.08) (0.08)
White 0.071* 0.042 −0.049
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Student 0.015 0.022 −0.050
(0.03) (0.06) (0.05)
College 0.090** −0.083 −0.178***
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07)
Post-grad 0.018 −0.187** −0.234**
(0.06) (0.09) (0.09)
Full  time 0.134** 0.038 0.028
(0.06) (0.09) (0.08)
Part-time 0.106* −0.009 −0.009
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
Unemployed 0.100* 0.175** 0.096
(0.06) (0.09) (0.08)
Income [<20,000] 0.836*** 0.127 0.168*
(0.04) (0.09) (0.09)
Income [20,000–40,000] 0.864*** 0.262*** 0.219**
(0.04) (0.09) (0.09)
Income [40,000–60,000] 0.844*** 0.076 0.161
(0.05) (0.11) (0.10)
Income [>60,000] 0.901*** 0.109 0.200*
(0.05) (0.11) (0.11)
Constant −0.153** 0.401*** 0.507***
(0.07) (0.15) (0.15)
N  465 465 465
R-sqr  0.499 0.094 0.068
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001. Individual characteristics, with the exception of income, come from Prolific
Academic and are provided by users when registering. To control for income, we  use responses to our own demographic questionnaire, with people not
revealing their income as the omitted category.
Table A12
Sensitive questions – Poisson regression.
Disclosure index SQ
[1] [2]
Positive treatment −0.068** −0.061*
(0.03) (0.03)
Negative treatment −0.069** −0.058**
(0.03) (0.03)
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N  475 465
Pseudo R-sqr 0.002 0.012
Actual coefficients are reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001. See footnote to Table A11.
Table A13
Regressions on Social action and Attitudes.
Charity Privacy concern Likely Give Information
Positive 0.055 0.002 −0.000
(0.05) (0.06) (0.04)
Negative 0.004 0.027 0.025
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Wave  −0.001 −0.068 0.027
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Age  −0.006** 0.002 0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gender −0.100** −0.095** 0.045
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
US  nationality −0.006 0.069 −0.030
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06)
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Table  A13 (Continued)
Charity Privacy concern Likely Give Information
White −0.040 0.052 0.027
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Student −0.104** 0.021 −0.001
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
College 0.078 −0.087 −0.058
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04)
Postgrad 0.074 −0.221** −0.015
(0.09) (0.09) (0.06)
Full-time 0.090 0.070 −0.029
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06)
Part-time 0.044 0.026 −0.004
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06)
Unemployed 0.043 0.060 −0.038
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Income [<20,000] 0.041 0.048 −0.089
(0.09) (0.09) (0.06)
Income [20,000–40,000] −0.085 0.073 −0.129**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.06)
Income [40,000–60,000] −0.039 0.164 −0.121
(0.10) (0.11) (0.08)
Income [>60,000] −0.024 −0.038 −0.013
(0.12) (0.12) (0.08)
EFF  familiarity 0.196***
(0.03)




Constant 0.738*** 0.258 0.954***
(0.16) (0.16) (0.10)












R-sqr 0.147 0.145 0.032
obust standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001. See footnote to Table A11.
ppendix B. Extract of newspaper articles
xtract of newspaper articles
Positive treatment: Collected from computerweekly.com on the 18th May  2015.
“Dropbox secures data privacy-focused ISO 27018 standard”
“Dropbox has followed in the footsteps of Microsoft to become an early adopter of the privacy-focused ISO 27018 standard,
hich is used to signify how providers safeguard users’ cloud data.
The standard sets out a code of practice that governs how users’ personally identifiable information should be protected
y cloud providers.
Organisations that adhere to the ISO 27018 code of practice, therefore, must vow not to use this information in sales and
arketing materials, and must promise to provide users with details about where there data is kept and handled and to
otify them straightaway in the event of a data breach.”
Negative treatment: Collected from sherbit.io on the 17th April 2015.
“How Facebook Inc (FB) Is Getting Rich Using Your Personal Data”
“Researchers with the Belgian Privacy Commission conducted a comprehensive analysis of Facebook’s new Data Use
olicy and Terms of Service and concluded that the company is in violation of European law: it has authorized itself to
ontinuously collect users’ location information, sell users’ photos for advertising purposes, and track both users’ and non-
sers’ browsing habits across the internet—while failing to educate users on the true extent of this ‘tracking,’ and making it
rohibitively difficult for them to ‘opt-out.’
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Facebook’s cookies are stored in every browser that visits a site with a Social Plugin (the embedded ‘Like’ and ‘Share’
buttons), regardless of whether or not they are a Facebook user.”
Neutral treatment: Collected from computing.co.uk on the 12th February 2015.
“Why Wearable Tech Is Good for Your Health”
“The Apple Watch and Adidas’s plans for including wearable technology in its shoe and clothing lines have been drawing
attention recently, as the age of always-accessible information is upon us.
In the era of the Internet of Things — when our homes are linked to our smartphones and everything else is linked to a
network — it’s still somewhat surprising to realize that entire industries have yet to be transformed by increased connectivity.
Until recently, one of those areas was arguably the health field.
Yes, files have been switched to online servers for some time now. But it’s only been in the past year or so that the health
industry has begun to be revolutionized by the possibilities technology offers.”
Appendix C. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.jebo.2017.03.024.
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